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MONETARY CONDITIONS AND FAIR CURRENCIES: GAUGING THE
STANCE OF MONETARY CONDITIONS AND FAIR MONETARY CURRENCY
VALUES
By: Dr. Jose M. Barrionuevo'
Director of Emerging Markets Strategy
Barclays Capital Inc.2

MONETARY CONDITIONS AND FAIR CURRENCIES

Gauging the Stance of Monetary Conditions and Fair Monetary Currency Values
Introduction
One of the leading drivers of financial opportunities is the Central Bank's
ability to reign-in and keep inflation low. As a result, gauging the stance of monetary
conditions has been a critical component of interest rate policy decisions. Economists
have increasingly turned as well to measures of how tight or how loose monetary
conditions might be at any given time. Tight monetary conditions are usually associated
with relatively high interest rates that could be near a cyclical high, thus paving the way
for rising bond prices, and stable or appreciating currencies. If monetary conditions are
loose, however, interest rates would be too low both in nominal and real terms, thereby
limiting the ability of the monetary authorities to contain inflation pressures. The Central
Banks of Canada and New Zealand have pioneered most of the complex work that goes
into gauging the stance of monetary conditions. Invariably, though, the key concept that
captures the basic tenant of the how tight or loose monetary conditions might be is the
notion that interest rates and exchange rates and their equilibrium interaction provide the
most critical measure of the stance of monetary conditions. As a result, tight monetary
conditions are usually tied to high-enough interest rates and stable or appreciating
currencies, while loose monetary conditions are usually tied to unsustainably low interest
rates and weakening currencies. Because of the sharp improvement in monetary
management that followed the adoption of floating exchange rate regimes. leading Latin
American economies today provide a unique opportunity to gauge the monetary stance
base on the framework developed by industrialized nations. We argue that monetary
management is the single most important achievement of Latin American economies in
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ensuring that financial conditions remain stable. Indeed, for the first time in modem Latin
American history. all the leading Central Banks in the region, Brazil, Mexico, Chile and
Colombia have entered the recent period of US monetary tightening with fairly- valued
currencies, as opposed to grossly overvalued currencies as it happened typically in the
past, as well as with tight monetary policies, rather than the past loose monetary policies
that invariably led to currency crises.
Still, despite all the progress made, determining the monetary stance is
especially difficult because any assessment hinges on the choice of a reference period
when monetary conditions are deemed to be neutral, which in turn depends on an
uncertain, equilibrium real exchange rate. To deal with this, we focused on a monetary
measure that weighs actual, not necessarily equilibrium, real interest and exchange rate
levels as well as changes in the interest rate and in the exchanges rate compared to a
measure of its fair value. Accordingly, the stance of monetary conditions is gauged based
on whether monetary conditions have become tighter or looser vis-a-vis a reference
period, without making a specific reference to whether they were too tight or not to start
with. We emphasized actual, objective levels of real interest rates by assigning a 2/3
weight to the real foreign exchange-adjusted interest rate and 1/3 to the equal weighted
average of the change in the real interest rate and a measure of real exchange rate over- or
under-valuation given a fair value of the real exchange rate. The fair value of the real
exchange rate, in turn, is derived from the relative inflation differential adjusted by
productivity differentials between the reference country and the United States for an
equilibrium base year. The base year needs to satisfy two conditions. First, both the
current and capital accounts need to be in equilibrium. And second, the actual real
interest rate for such period needs to be associated with a relatively stable real exchange
rate.
In this regard, while the equilibrium exchange rate is not known, we can still
infer whether it has become more appreciated or depreciated based on fundamental
events that capture an economy's price and productive competitiveness. For example,
should medium-term capital inflows strengthen. such as foreign direct investment, or
technical progress rise. or the fiscal stance strengthen markedly, or significant structural
reforms be implemented. the equilibrium real exchange rate would tend to appreciate,
suggesting that its fair value would lie below the present level. However. if structural
conditions change only slowly, there is a greater chance that the equilibrium real
exchange rate is close to a measure of fair value based on price competitiveness. In our
view, this is what has happened in Latin America over the past four years - except
perhaps for Brazil, where progress on fiscal performance and reforms has been much
better than expected a few years ago. Accordingly, a measure of FX fair value would err
in understating the level of overvaluation or overstating the extent of undervaluation if
reforms advanced or economic policies strengthened. However, FX overvaluation might
be understated if such progress was made, suggesting that the equilibrium FX may be
stronger in Brazil than actually estimated to be.
Measuring the Stance of Monetary Conditions
The monetary measure constructed provides broad guidance as to the behavior
of monetary conditions and. in that sense. how they evolve over time appears more
relevant than a measure of how loose or tight monetary conditions are to start with. The
Monetary Conditions (MC) measure introduced helps to draw more definite implications.
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First. a measure of monetary conditions is estimated through a weighted average between
the actual levels and changes in the actual real interest and exchange rates. The measure
provides definite guidance as to whether the monetary stance is becoming tighter or
looser. It captures the concept of broad monetary neutrality discussed above and. more
importantly, is more sensitive to short-term changes, or "blips," in the monetary stance.
We used a weighted average of the change in the real interest rate and the change in the
real measure of exchange rate over- or under-valuation to gauge the direction of change
in the monetary stance, regardless of how many times and how much the Central Bank
has tightened monetary conditions. This gives a sense of how effective the monetary
authority has been in tightening or loosening monetary conditions. This measure does not
have an explicit view on when monetary conditions were "fair," or broadly neutral, to
start with and, in that sense, may provide better guidance.
We thus relied on the change or direction of monetary conditions, as measured
by the expected real interest rate and a productivity-adjusted measure of real exchange
rate over- or undervaluation. This measure hinges on the base, fair value period. The
reference period for the fair foreign exchange rate is that period during which the current
account was roughly balanced and monetary conditions helped achieve an inflation rate
that might be thought to be compatible with the country's structural growth capacity and.
therefore, with a balanced measure of price competitiveness. The required currency
depreciation corresponds to fair value changes implied by the relative price changes
between the US and the specific Latin country based on the initial fair value of the currency.
If the country's inflation rate remains well above US inflation, a weaker currency will be
required, while if it is below the level in the US. the fair value of the currency will be
stronger than its reference value. This measure of over- or undervaluation is then adjusted
by the average annual productivity differential between the US and the reference countries.
In this setting. our MC directional component measures a productivity-adjusted monetary
stance based on an equal-weighted average of the change in the real interest rate and the real
over- or undervaluation of the exchange rate.
Brazil's Tight Monetary Stance
In a world with still ample liquidity and fairly accommodative monetary
policies, Brazil's monetary policy has been especially prudent and willing to err on the
side of caution. In fact, the bias of the monetary stance has been decisively toward tight
monetary conditions. In this setting, a measure of monetary conditions based on the
direction of monetary policy, as suggested by a weighted average of the change in the real
interest rate and the real exchange rate. shows that the monetary stance was, on balanced.,
fairly loose in Brazil from 2001 through the first half of 2003, thus accounting for the marked
rebound in inflation from the fourth quarter of 2002 through the first half of 2003 (Figure 1).
In fact, our measure of the direction of monetary conditions shows that until the second
half of 2003, the bias in monetary policy was to actually loosen conditions rather sharply
from 2001 through the first half of 2003. This does not mean that monetary policy was
not being tightened. but that its impact did not become restrictive enough until the second
half of 2003. In our view, this partly reflects the fact that monetary policy was tightened
somewhat late in 2002 amid sharp BRL pressures starting in the second half of 2002.
Monetary conditions became very tight from the second half of 2003 through the

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

3

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 4

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

end of the first half of 2004. Indeed, the recent spike on inflation can be explained by the
loosening of monetary conditions at the end of second quarter of 2004, while the sharp drop
in inflation during 2003 reflects the marked tightening of the monetary stance beginning in
the second quarter of 2003. After being close to broadly neutral into the summer,
monetary conditions are now fairly restrictive (Figure 2). In fact, the monetary stance
today, in our view, may be tighter than our measure of the stance of monetary conditions
might suggest because of the recent gains in productivity in Brazil as investment has
strengthened during the second half of 2004.
Figure 1: Brazil - The Stance of Monetary Conditions (MC) vs. Inflation
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Statistic, Barclays Capital.
Computing a measure of the stance of monetary conditions based on a weighted
average of productivity-adjusted percentage deviations in the actual value of the BRL
versus its fair value and changes in the real interest rate would bring together two key
concepts of the underlying strength of monetary conditions. The key finding here is that
monetary conditions in Brazil have been tight and are now much tighter than a simple
measure of monetary conditions might suggest (Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Brazil - The Stance of Monetary Conditions (MC)
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Source: Banco Centraldo Brasil, U.S. Department of Labor-Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Barclays Capital.
The Fair BRL Real
Our measure of BRL exchange rate over- or undervaluation adjusted by
average Brazilian productivity gains or losses vis- -vis the US during the year
underscores the impact of relative prices moves and productivity trends on the country's
export competitiveness. A close inspection of Brazil's balance of payments suggests that
the level of the BRL was near equilibrium at BRL 2.09 in March 2001, as a sharp
devaluation brought an otherwise important current account deficit into balance. The bias
of this measure. if any, would be in understating the current level of BRL undervaluation,
as an earlier, lower fair BRL value would be tied to an even stronger fair value for the
BRL currently, suggesting an even stronger undervaluation than otherwise measured.4
Also, a productivity gain differential in favor of Brazil over the US would suggest that
the "standard" measure of real exchange rate over- or undervaluation would be
overstating the actual extent of overvaluation or understating the extent of
undervaluation.
Our measure of BRL over- or undervaluation adjusted for productivity
differentials between Brazil and the US suggests that the BRL was overvalued by as
much as 6% in early 2001. The BRL then depreciated markedly in 2002, and as it fell
3 US and Brazilian productivity gains indices are based on standard production per worked-hours in

manufacturing data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the National Industrial Confederation.
respectively.
After a 40% depreciation through September 200 1, it would be especially difficult to argue that the
BRL was still overvalued.
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dramatically through October, the competitive position of the BRL switched to a large,
26% undervalued position by November 2002 on a productivity-adjusted basis (Figure 3).
During 2002 and 2003, however, US productivity gains sharply surpassed Brazilian gains
- by an average of 6.4% in 2002 and 4.9% in 2003. In 2001 and thus far in 2004, the
average productivity differential between the US and Brazil is essentially zero, with
Brazil experiencing sharp gains that surpassed those of the US in recent months, as
Brazilian domestic investment has strengthened. As a result of this development and a
sharp monetary tightening that led to high real interest rates, BRL undervaluation rose
dramatically to a high of about 30% during the third quarter of 2003. After that, BRL
undervaluation has fallen, and now it is close to its fair value with a 1.4% overvaluation
over the March level of 2.55.
Figure 3: Brazil - BRL Over- Undervaluation: Productivity Unadjusted vs.
Productivity Adjusted
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Source: Banco Central do Brasil, US Departnentof Labor- Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Barclavs Capital.
The highest levels of BRL undervaluation occurred during the fourth quarter of
2002. a year in which the BRL devalued markedly; late 2001; and early 2004, when real
interest rates rose to a high of 10.5% and the BRL was over 12% undervalued (Figure 4).
This suggests that the period of tightest monetary conditions was the second half of 2003.
Monetary conditions, however, are now tightening markedly after a brief period of modest
loosening during the second quarter of 2004. What is critical is that Brazilian monetary
conditions have been consistently tight and that rebounds in inflation have been associated
with either political shocks (as in 2002) or global credit shocks (as in April of 2004 when
the US Federal Reserve was believed to be on the verge of tightening monetary conditions
markedly).
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Figure 4: Brazil - Real Interest Rate vs. Productivity-Adjusted Real BRL Over/Under-Valuation
Roductivity-Adjusted
Real BRL Over-/ Under Valuation

\

\

Over-Valuation

Real Interest Rate

1

2001
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Barcilays Capital.
The average fair value for the last six months is about 2.62 BRL per dollar and
2.58 BRL per dollar in March 2005, suggesting that the BRL is about 1.4% overvalued
(Figure 5). This does not mean, of course, that the BRL will necessarily weaken to BRL
2.58 or so, but that it could slightly depreciate below BRL 2.58 without necessarily
affecting Brazil's export performance.
The fair value of the BRL has shifted from BRL 2.18 in late 2001, when the
BRL was trading at BRL 2.54, to BRL 2.42 in July of 2002, and to a low of BRL 2.57
early this year when the BRL was actually at 2.85 per dollar. Not surprisingly, the
competitive bias on the BRL (in addition to Brazil's investment recovery and stronger
global growth) helps explain why Brazilian exports have remained so competitive in the
last two years (Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Brazil's BRL Actual vs. Fair Value (Productivity Adjusted)
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Source: Banco Central do Brasil, U.S. Department of Labor-Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Barclays Capital.
The BRL and Interest Rates in 2005
In a setting where growth remains well supported, investment is recovering, the
BRL is close to its fair value, and the balance of payments performance is exemplary, the
BRL is likely to strengthen somewhat if inflation continues to decline. Indeed, recent
moves to tighten monetary conditions are proving effective in bringing inflation down
more rapidly than envisaged by financial markets, despite recent hikes in utility prices.
Although the BRL is likely to be under further strong upward pressure and likely to
strengthen, our concern is that the monetary authorities appear to have signaled concern
over export growth when, of course, their exclusive goal is to bring inflation down, and
soon, given that the high real interest rates are limiting further improvements in Brazil's
debt dynamics. The fairly hawkish bias of the Central Bank of Brazil has tried to ensure
that the BRL remains stable to continue to rein in inflation. However, the immediate
pass-through of the BRL to inflation, as seen both in 2002-03 and during the second half
of 2004, in our view, should only increase the resolution of the Central Bank to ensure a
somewhat stronger BRL, as long as the currency remains competitive - as it is today. In
this sense, intervention to draw a line to avoid a massive appreciation (well below BRL
2.62 or so) might make sense to ensure that Brazilian exports remain competitive in the
face of a possible slowdown of global economic activity. Unlike Mexico today, the passthrough of the BRL to inflation is significant, suggesting that some BRL strength ahead
of a possible global slowdown and likely future downward pressures on the BRL, the
Central Bank appears keen to lower inflation and eventually the high interest rates.
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Because a hawkish stance implies high real interest rates. Brazilian fiscal policy will
become increasingly instrumental in allowing for gradual declines in real interest rates. as
Brazil's primary fiscal surplus (possibly above the targeted 4.5% of GDP in 2004) delivers
strong savings that should continue to ease pressures on real interest rates. Recent BRL
intervention may also underscore a renewed focus on further rebuilding international reserves,
especially ahead of the expiration of the present IMF program in March 2005. Finally, both a
strong fiscal anchor and declining inflation will continue to help bring real interest rates lower,
while a continued shift from dollar- to BRL-denominated debt will continue to ease financial
vulnerabilities stemming from a high, yet declining stock of domestic debt, which stands at
about 45% of GDP. While the composition of Brazilian domestic debt has shifted from dollarlinked to Selic-debt primarily, the effective improvement in its composition appears more
limited since interest rates and the exchange rate tend to move markedly during periods of
credit pressures. In fact, short of eliminating indexation, which would be a desirable policy
action, indexation to inflation would prove much more effective in easing the vulnerability of
Brazilian debt to credit shocks that weaken the BRL and lead to higher interest rates. Inflation
indexation would result in more limited net increases in financing requirements because both
nominal payments and tax revenues would be rising, limiting their real cost.
Mexico's Monetary Stance and 2005 Inflation
Besides US Fed policy, Mexico's disinflation story from 2000 through mid2003 reflects the steady decline in services inflation and. therefore, in wage growth (as
real wages represent the implicit relative price of services). Indeed. the remarkable
correlation between wage growth, and services inflation shows that after disinvestment
began in 2000, Mexico's disinflation has had as much influence on the steady decline in
wages as has the accommodative monetary stance pursued by the US Federal Reserve
(Figure 6). Mexico's marked disinvestment followed the end of the US high tech bubble
of 2000. and, hence. the onset of the US slowdown, which helped to keep growth in
Mexican domestic investment at sub-par levels through end-2003. This reduced the
demand for labor at a time when labor supply continued to grow steadily, thus
exacerbating downward pressure on real wages. Real wages declined by about 1%
recently, after growing by over 4% in 2001. The "excess" investment of the 1990s.
however, led businesses to focus on strengthening productivity growth, an objective that
finally is being met and has contributed to the marked decline in unit labor costs.
Mexico's remarkable decline in inflation through the end of 2003 also helped to reduce
inflation expectations, and wages. However, with inflation expectations rising, wages are
unlikely to fall much further and could even begin moving higher for the first time since
disinflation began, albeit this is still unlikely.
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Figure 6: Mexico - Nominal Wage Growth vs. Services Inflation (YIY)
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Merchandise inflation, on the other hand, has been rising steadily since early
2003, recently surpassing services inflation (albeit only slightly) for the first time. Still,
most of the rise has been offset by the continued decline in services inflation and wage
growth. Although food has been a more important driver of core inflation, merchandise
also has been relevant, especially after the summer, suggesting that vigorous consumer
spending in the face of capacity constraints may indeed be impacting inflation
performance more than realized.
Our MC analysis shows that Mexico's monetary stance tightened modestly in
the first quarter of 2004 to then loosen somewhat in the second quarter. The prior period
of monetary loosening began in the second quarter of 2002, after a period of easing in
2001. The bias toward a tightening monetary stance, but erring on the side of somewhat
loose monetary conditions, after mid-2002 is, of course, consistent with the sharp global
monetary easing that took place during this period. The stance of monetary conditions
tightened after the summer of 2004 to reach a broadly neutral position during the fourth
quarter of the year and a tight stance more recently (Figure 7).
A gradual monetary tightening through most of this period, except in the second
quarter of 2004, kept inflation rising. forcing a move toward an even tighter monetary
stance in December and, early this year. Shifting to a tight monetary stance, as seen in
early 2002, however, required assuming that the productivity-adjusted real exchange rate
remains stable. The key point is that the modest monetary tightening until recently likely
began from a loose monetary stance, which is why Mexico's monetary tightening probably

The leading contributor to inflationary pressures, in our view, is rising inflation expectations.
followed by stronger-than-envisaged consumer spending. MXN depreciation has a markedly more
limited pass-through than it had in the past. However, rising inflation does exert meaningful
pressures on the peso. albeit its value likely will continue to be dominated by rising interest rates.
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will continue during 2005. In our view, shifting to an effective, tight monetary stance will
require one more 25 bp rise in the overnight interest rate. In light of major operational
drawbacks of Banxico's monetary tool: the corto, or targeted borrowed reserves
framework, the most powerful way of changing the financial markets' inflation
expectations involves the intra-meeting announcements, which can lead to sharp, frontloaded moves in interest rates, as seen in April. Because even these actions are subject to
the interpretation and reaction of the leading commercial banks in Mexico, Banco de
Mexico will have to switch to a reference rate system earlier than envisaged. The reason is
that sometimes when the Central Bank sends a strong monetary signal, local banks shrug
off the hike in the overnight rate, rather than swiftly raising rates as the signal suggests.
This problem likely will become more acute when inflation starts to turn around and the
long end of the MXN yield curve rallies, putting downward pressure on the short-end of
the yield curve, even if Banco de Mexico wants to keep those rates still high because is not
yet easing.
Figure 7: Mexico - Stance of Monetary Conditions (MC) vs. Inflation
8%.
6%.

MC =Weighted Avg of Level and Direction of
kMonetary Conditions and Trendline (6th grade)
L ,-,,,,-

9%
Tight Money

8/
8%o

4%

7%

2%.

6%
-2%-

. ..

-6%.

" Mexi
M can"4
Loose Money

8%-

1%0%.
2001

2002

Inflation
(Y/
2003

2004

L 3%
2005

Source: Banco de Mexico, US Departnentof Labor- Bureau of Labor Statistics, Barclas
Capital.
Finally, our measure of the monetary stance based on a benchmark fair value
level of the MXN (as well as variations in the MXN's fair value based on relative
movements in US and Mexican prices and productivity compared with the actual level of
the MXN) suggests that monetary conditions were fairly loose from 2000 through mid2004 and then began tightening modestly in the second half of 2004 (Figure 8). The fairly
easy stance of monetary conditions is consistent with the steady decline in the fed funds
rate and, hence, the US monetary policy. A key driver of the result, of course, is the large
difference in productivity gains in favor of the US relative to Mexico from 2000 through
the first half of 2004. With the return of domestic investment, productivity began
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growing more rapidly in Mexico than in the US in the past few months. This measure
shows that the monetary stance has tightened after correcting for productivity
differentials. However, the amount of monetary tightening appears more robust now at
nearly 4%.

Figure 8: Mexico - A Tight Stance of Monetary Conditions (MC)
MC =Weighted Avg of Level and Direction of
Monetary Conditions

Tight Money
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Source: Banco de Mexico, U.S. Department of Labor-Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Barclays Capital.
The Fair Value MXN
In the setting of recently tighter monetary conditions, Figure 9 shows that the
productivity-adjusted fair value of the peso implied by the productivity-adjusted monetary
stance is about MXN 11.03 today, suggesting that the MXN is slightly undervalued. Not
surprisingly, the MXN is now undervalued and its sharp 16% overvaluation peak reached in
the first quarter of 2002 is now gone (Figure 9).
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Figure 9: MXN Peso Actual vs. Fair Value (Productivity-adjusted)
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Source: Banco de Mexico. US Department of Labor- Bureau of Labor Statistics, Barclays
Capital.

Whether monetary conditions were initially too tight or too loose can also be
inferred from the actual levels of potential over- or undervaluation of the MXN, and
especially the level of expected real interest rates (Figure 10). Ifreal interest rates begin
from an unusually low level, they may have to rise more strongly than if they' began from
a higher level. and. therefore, from a much tighter monetary stance.
Unlike during the 2001-02 periods, real interest rates were low when Banxico's
monetary tightening began in early 2004 (Figure 10). After rising markedly in the second
quarter of 2004 from an unusually low 1%-handle, real interest rates stayed at around 2%
until recently when they have moved to about 3%. Indeed. Mexico's monetary challenge may
be as straightforward as the simple fact that real interest rates fell to about 1% starting in the
second half of 2003 and, except for brief periods, have not moved to higher, more sustainable
levels.
Although nominal interest rates have been moving higher, they have been doing so
only gradually, thus limiting the extent of the actual monetary tightening that helps to abate
inflationary pressures. In the past, during periods of sharp hikes in nominal interest rates, real
interest rates moved higher and inflation came down quickly. For example, during the last
quarter of 2000, nominal Cetes rates reached a 17.9% peak and inflation quickly declined
from about 9.5% to 7.5% by the end of the first quarter of 2002. Of course, this does not
mean that real interest rates again have to rise to I 001 to rein in inflation, but it does mean
that discrete, front-loaded hikes in interest rates go a long way toward easing inflationary
pressures. Gradual moves, however, risk lagging behind inflation and, therefore, eventually
ending at a much higher nominal level than a front-loaded move would have required.
Indeed, times of gradual moves usually led to climbing inflation and declining real interest
rates that eventually exacerbated both inflation pressures and interest rate hikes.
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Figure 10: Mexico - Real Interest Rate vs. Productivity-adjusted Real MXN Over/Undervaluation
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Capital.
The MXN and Interest Rates in 2005
To curb inflationary pressures, Banco de Mexico has taken a hawkish stance
that is now leading financial markets to make discrete interest rates hikes to ensure that
real interest rates are high enough to bring down inflation more rapidly. While Banco de
Mexico is firmly committed to pro-actively leading financial markets to tighter monetary
conditions, its monetary policy instrument, the corto, has hindered Banxico's ability to
pursue the kind of sharp. front-loaded tightening campaign that could have contained
inflation sooner. Instead, to enhance the corto's efficacy, Banco de Mexico has relied on
unanticipated corto moves that result in a higher overnight interest rate.
The Mexican experience shows that the critical issue over interest rates is not how
high they get, but how long they stay there. Banco de Mexico, in our view, is now
effectively leading financial markets to interest rate hikes that are likely to break inflation
expectations and, indeed, swiftly contain inflationary pressures. With core inflation at 4.2%,
sharper, hawkish, unanticipated monetary tightening is now acting to strengthen inflation
performance.
In October 2004, Banco de Mexico raised the corto for the ninth time in 2004
to 69 MDP from 63 MDP in an unanticipated move to break inflation expectations. The
hike underscores a more hawkish monetary stance that should succeed in breaking
inflation expectations. Early this year, Banxico raised the corto by 6 MDP to reach 75
MDP, and then on February, the corto was raised to 77 MDP. On March 11, 2005,
Banxico left the corto at its previous level of 77 MDP.
As inflation expectations improve, Mexico's local yield curve should flatten.
The MXN, which now looks somewhat undervalued, should gain strong support,
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especially as further monetary tightening takes place in a bearish (albeit still expansive)
US dollar global environment. Inflation should be peaking in the near term, despite some
utility price hikes during January and February. As a result, rising short-term interest
rates, declining inflation and a declining USD (on a trend basis) should provide sharp
support to the MXN.
Chile's Sharp Monetary Conditions
Chile's monetary stance began 2004 from one the tightest positions in Latin
America, resulting in further support for the CLP by the end of 2003 and early 2004
(Figure 11). High copper prices and euro appreciation have also contributed to keep the
CLP relatively strong in 2004. In general, the CLP performed strongly on the back of a
sharply improved global backdrop, especially for copper prices.
Monetary conditions eased rapidly after the first quarter of 2004, as monetary
easing led to a drop in real interest rates from just over 2.5% to slightly negative recently.
In this setting, Chilean inflation fell quickly from a high of about 4.5% in early 2003 to
almost 1% price deflation a year later, prompting the Central Bank to ease monetary
conditions sharply. Accordingly, the Chilean stance of monetary conditions eased quite
dramatically starting late in the first quarter of 2004 and thereafter. The dramatic
monetary easing that followed helped reduced our MC measure from over 14% to a low
of 1% and, thus. not far from a balanced stance in December 2004. In the meantime,
monetary easing has resulted in a steady rise in inflation to about 2.3% recently.
Figure 11: Chile - Stance of Monetary Conditions (MC) vs. Inflation
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A fair value measure of the exchange rate-adjusted MC suggests that Chilean
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monetary conditions have been consistently tight since the second half of 2003. There are
two periods in which monetary conditions could be thought of as loose: in 2001 and early in
2003. Still, the level of easing is fairly small at a MC of about 2% in early 2005, compared
with over 10% in early 2000 (Figure 12). As a result, inflation may continue to rise
somewhat, but should start leveling off as the Central Bank tightens monetary conditions by
another 150 bp. This would place Chilean real interest rates near 1.25% or so in 2005, thus
helping to keep inflation stable near 2.75% in 2005.
Figure 12: Chile - The Stance of Monetary Conditions (MC)
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The Fair Value Peso
The fair CLP-adjusted MC suggests that the peso's fair value is CLP 612.64,
suggesting that the currency is modestly overvalued. However, the present extent of
overvaluation likely will help the Central Bank contain inflationary pressures more
effectively in the near term. Further, should copper prices move to a structurally higher
equilibrium level than in the past owing to supply constraints, the Chilean peso may
indeed be close to its fair value.
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Figure 13: Chilean Peso Actual vs. Fair Value

CLP/ USD Actual Value

8.4% Over-Valuation
(CLP/ USD March'05 Value = 565.00
and CLP/ USD Fair Value =612.64)

/
Productivity-Adjusted
CLP/ USD Fair Value
=cuI1

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Source: Banco Central de Chile, Barclays Capital.
The CLP and Interest Rates in 2005
In 2005, the Chilean Central Bank will likely raise interest rates gradually to
contain inflationary pressures. In our view, interest rates could rise by another 150 bp as
the Central Bank gradually tightens monetary policy, following US monetary tightening
to some extent. Should the Fed raise its reference rate to 4.0%, the Chilean Central Bank
may raise interest rates to a level near the fed funds rate or just lower for a flat. or perhaps
small interest rate differential in favor of the United States. This would lead to a slight
CLP depreciation in 2005 as the interest rate differential moves somewhat in favor of the
US or. at best, a level that slightly favor Chilean financial assets. More importantly,
copper prices may weaken somewhat after their stellar 2004 performance as global
demands slow somewhat in 2005. In this setting, after initially strengthening on euro
strength and still-high copper prices, the CLP should weaken gradually in 2005 to close
the year at 610. Because real interest are slightly negative and the CLP is slightly
overvalued, accommodative monetary conditions should be turning more restrictive in
2005, limiting the decline in the CLP as copper prices began falling and interest rate
differentials start moving closer to US interest rates. In this sense, Chile's monetary
policy is the only one in Latin America that truly resembles the Fed's stance and for
which monetary pressures have been building more closely in line with those in the US,
after starting from deflation in early 2004.
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Figure 14: Chile - Real Interest Rate and Real Chilean Peso Over-/ UnderValuation
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Colombia's Restrictive Monetary Conditions
Colombia's present monetary stance is the tightest today (on a currency
unadjusted basis) among all major Latin countries. This explains why the Colombian peso
continues to be under such strong upward pressure (Figure 15). In fact, Colombia's MC has
adopted the most consistently tight monetary stance in Latin America this year, with only a
brief decline in the MC 10.1% handle during the second quarter. As a result of the
remarkably tight monetary policy, inflation resumed a clear downward trend beginning in
the second half of 2004.
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Figure 15: Colombia - Stance of Monetary Conditions (MC) vs. Inflation
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A fair value COP-adjusted MC suggests that monetary conditions have been
almost as tight as implied by a simple MC, but since the second half of 2002 the Central
Bank has eased markedly only in the second half of 2004, albeit still within a tight
monetary stance (Figure 16). This suggests that the COP may still be under some nearterm upward pressures. but it may start declining in early 2005 from recent highs and,
perhaps, an even more appreciated level at the start of 2005. Banco de Ia Republica has
received little credit for Colombia's financial success in 2005. In fact, however, its astute
monetary management has been the leading driver of Colombia's improved sovereign
stance in 2004. In 2005, monetary conditions may start easing somewhat more rapidly if
there is continued upward pressure on the COP during 2005.
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Figure 16: Colombia - A Tight Stance of Monetary Conditions (MC)
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The Fair Value COP
The remarkable, persistent strength of the Colombian Peso can be inferred from
our FX fair value exercise. Our COP fair value calculation suggests that the peso got to
be as much as 21 % undervalued during the first quarter of 2003. Since then, COP
undervaluation has declined steadily to start showing overvaluation since December of
2004. As a result, inflation is going down somewhat more rapidly, and the Central Bank
is reaching a more stable COP to handle. It is clear, though, that part of the continued
strength of the COP, well beyond that of other LatAm currencies can be explained by the
fact that it began from a much more undervalued level that other undervalued regional
currencies, notably the BRL. Indeed, Colombia's unique combination of the tightest
monetary stance in Latin America today together with the most undervalued currency to
start with helps account for the persistent remarkable strength of the COP. In 2005, COP
pressures are likely to build gradually as monetary conditions loosen and the COP
strengthens to a modestly overvalued level in early 2005. In fact, because Banco de la
Republica has been building reserves to limit the peso's strength and yet the currency
continues to appreciate, it may have to start easing monetary conditions more rapidly in
early 2005 to avoid a sharp deterioration in the trade balance and, especially, export
growth, as the global economy slows somewhat and commodity prices begin declining.
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Figure 17: Colombian Peso Actual vs Fair Value
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The COP and Interest Rates in 2005
In order to bring inflation down, the monetary authorities will be prepared to
endure some further appreciation of the Colombian peso vis-a-vis the US dollar in early
2005, but the ensuing sharp deterioration in trade trends will lead to a depreciating COP,
perhaps during the second half of 2005. The COP appreciation wilt help bring inflation
down more rapidly into the first half of 2005, when inflation should fall to about 5.3%.
As the current account deficit grows, late in the first half of the year and especially during
the second half, the COP will start depreciating more rapidly, especially as the US
economy slows down. The COP is therefore likely to appreciate early in the year to about
COP 2,350, start depreciating gradually during the second quarter and then more rapidly
during the second half to close the year at around COP 2.575, for an annual average of
COP 2,495 in 2005, compared with COP 2,631.3 in 2004.
As the COP continues to strengthen, inflation will start falling somewhat more
rapidly, thus potentially allowing the Banco de la Republica to cut interest rates in early
2005. It is clear that the Central Bank's preferred policy for dealing with COP peso
strength has been to build reserves. However, reserve accumulation, though dramatically
improved in 2004, has failed to ease the strong upward pressures on the COP. As a result,
Banco de Ia Republica may find itself cutting interest rates next year - despite the US
tightening cycle. While real interest rates are low, they are close to the 2% handle they've
been at for the past year. suggesting that the Central Bank may still have some room to
cut interest rates as the euro strengthens, workers' remittances remain strong, and the
COP continues to strengthen.
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Figure 18: Colombia - Real Interest Rate and Real Colombian Peso Over-/UnderValuation
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Conclusions

We introduced a simple measure of the stance of monetary conditions that
incorporates a directional component that measures the impact of the change of monetary
conditions to help gauge them more accurately, regardless of the initial stance. The
directional component of MC relies on a fair value concept of the real exchange rate that
helps track the impact of a country's competitiveness on the stance of monetary
conditions. The concept is then introduced in our MC measure of the stance of monetary
conditions that relies on both the actual level and the change in monetary conditions to
gauge how tight or loose monetary policy might be at any given time.
We gauged the stance of monetary conditions in Brazil, Mexico, Chile and
Colombia to conclude that monetary conditions are especially tight in Latin America and
that, for the first time in modern history, foreign exchange rates entered a US monetary
tightening cycle being undervalued. During 2000-03, Brazil, Chile and Colombia had
markedly undervalued currencies that helped strengthen the country's competitiveness.
During that period, however, the Mexican peso was markedly overvalued. Today, the
Brazilian Real and the Mexican peso are close to their fair values, while the Chilean and
Colombian pesos are slightly overvalued, in our view. Still, the sharp stance of monetary
conditions will likely allow Latin America to ensure stable financial conditions, unlike
most of its crisis-prone past.
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